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SUMMARY 
Disability supports should be designed to provide benefit and not burdens to 
eligible recipients. Unfortunately, this is not a reality when it comes to one of the 
main benefits open to Canadians with disability: the federal Disability Tax Credit 
(DTC). Designed to recognize some of the higher costs faced by people with severe 
disabilities and their caregivers, the DTC appears to be more of a burden for many, 
with estimated utilisation unacceptably low at around 40 per cent of working-aged 
adults with qualifying disabilities. 
Low uptake is a concern not only because people are missing out on the credit 
itself but also because eligibility to the DTC – which is not automatic – is a gateway 
to other important and more valuable benefits such as the Child Disability Benefit 
and Registered Disability Savings Plans (RDSP). 
Why is take up low? Awareness and a burdensome application process are likely 
key contributing factors. There is also a lack of clarity around eligibility rules, which 
have been criticized for being open to interpretation, failing to accurately reflect 
the practicalities of living with a disability and requiring people with impairments 
in mental functions to meet a higher bar than for those with physical impairments. 
The design of the DTC may also be limiting utilization of disability benefits such as 
RDSPs that require DTC eligibility as a prerequisite. As a non-refundable tax credit, 
the DTC is a tax-fairness measure that benefits those who pay taxes (provides 
no monetary value to those without taxable income). It is poor design to use 
eligibility to a benefit, that does not provide value to all individuals with qualifying 
disabilities, as a gateway to benefits with different policy objectives. 
A policy overhaul of the DTC, and broader disability policy in Canada, is long overdue. 
This will require effort and the will to make the necessary changes to improve 
existing policies. Boosting awareness of the DTC, gaining a better understanding of 
the target population (particularly children with disabilities) and monitoring data 
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on the DTC’s usage and reach, would go a long way towards improving uptake. Creation 
of a clear and transparent review and appeals process to replace the current and often 
inconsistent one would further knock down barriers to access. Improving the disability 
assessment process for the DTC and for other key disability benefits is also essential. 
More broadly, it is time for Canada to consider new coordinated policy measures that 
guarantee improved access, independence, portability and support for individuals with 
disability – particularly those living in low income.
1INTRODUCTION
Persons with disabilities and their caregivers face higher costs than those without disabilities, 
including higher medical costs, as well as higher hidden costs like more expensive transportation. 
The economic and social barriers faced by individuals with disabilities include a greater 
likelihood of unemployment or absence from the labour force and lower income compared to 
those without disabilities. Policy supports like the Disability Tax Credit (DTC) exist to address 
some of these barriers. 
The DTC is one of the principal federal supports for individuals in Canada with severe and 
prolonged impairments. Administered by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), it is designed to 
provide tax relief for non-itemizable (or hidden) disability- or therapy-related costs. The credit can 
be claimed by the individual with the disability and can also be transferred to an eligible caregiver 
such as a parent, grandparent or sibling to claim on their tax return. Eligibility to the credit 
provides access to other important benefits such as the Child Disability Benefit and Registered 
Disability Savings Plans (RDSP).
Yet, the DTC is under-utilized in Canada. This brief provides an overview of the DTC, an update 
on what available information tells us about its utilization across Canada (estimated to be only 
around 40 per cent among eligible working-age adults), and a discussion of contributing factors 
to this low uptake. We conclude with some practical policy solutions, including a call for more 
information and a decoupling of the DTC from other key benefits.
BACKGROUND
Persons with disabilities face higher costs of living and additional barriers
More than 1.8 million people live with a severe disability in Canada (Arim, 2015). These 
individuals and their caregivers face more barriers in economic, educational and social spheres 
than those living without disability (Prince, 2016). Canadians with severe mental and physical 
disabilities are more likely to be living in low income and face some of the highest levels of 
unemployment, underpinned by low levels of educational attainment and barriers to participating 
in the labour force (Till, Leonard, Yeung and Nicholls, 2015; Wall, 2017). For example, three in four 
adults with a developmental disability were not working in 2012, and only half had completed high 
school (Zwicker, Zaresani and Emery, 2017). These individuals also face higher costs associated 
with disability. This includes higher medical expenses, as well as higher hidden costs like more 
expensive utility and transportation costs (Mitra, Palmer, Kim, Mont and Groce, 2017).
The Disability Tax Credit is a key disability policy instrument that is under-utilized
Despite being one of the principal federal supports for individuals in Canada with severe and 
prolonged impairments, the DTC as presently designed does not meet the needs of many people 
with disabilities. Furthermore, it exists within a patchwork of federal and provincial measures that 
aim to address barriers faced by those living with a disability in Canada and their caregivers. 
A key design issue is the DTC’s non-refundable nature, which emerged as a policy response at 
a particular moment in time. Introduced in 1944 as a deduction for blind persons, the DTC was 
subsequently extended to individuals with severe disabilities. It was then converted to a non-
refundable tax credit along with other disability- and health-related tax benefits such as the Medical 
Expenses Tax Credit, as part of a broader tax reform in the late 1980s. 
The non-refundable tax credit design aims to promote horizontal equity by recognizing that the 
higher costs faced by people with disabilities are not true economic consumption and should be 
deducted from the income tax base (Smart and Stabile, 2006). This means that the DTC is not 
a subsidy for individuals with disabilities (like social assistance, for example); rather, it is a tax 
2fairness measure that recognizes that disability costs are unavoidable additional expenses not faced 
by other taxpayers (Tjorman et al., 2004). 
Utilization of the DTC is low
While the DTC is one of the main federal disability policy instruments, its utilization remains low.1 
Box 1 outlines terminology around eligibility. 
Box 1: Terminology
The following terms are used to describe eligibility for persons with disabilities: 
• A person deemed “eligible” for the DTC is a person in Canada with a severe 
and prolonged impairment in mental or physical function who meets the 
CRA’s eligibility criteria, whether or not they have successfully submitted a 
DTC application to the CRA. Estimating eligibility is difficult as we do not have 
population-level data that use the same criteria as CRA eligibility criteria. 
• A person “CRA-deemed eligible” for the DTC has successfully submitted a DTC 
application to the CRA, but may or may not file a tax return to claim the credit. 
This person is also eligible to claim other benefits (like the Child Disability 
Benefit and RDSP) that require CRA-deemed eligibility to the DTC. 
• A DTC claimant is CRA-deemed eligible for the DTC and has filed a tax return 
claiming none, some or all of the credit for themselves.
 
Our estimates suggest that only 40 per cent of working-aged adult individuals with a severe 
disability in Canada are CRA-deemed eligible for the DTC (Figure 1).2 Utilization varies across 
provinces and appears to be higher among younger adults than older adults (see Appendix 1). The 
latter may reflect the increasing prevalence of disability as people age and how people perceive 
disability (whether they consider their impairments to be a disability or just a natural part of aging, 
with the latter resulting in fewer older individuals applying for the DTC). Yet without better data 
and additional information it is difficult to know what is driving the variations in uptake across 
provinces and age.3
The DTC’s non-refundable design is likely one key contributing factor to lower utilization. Non-
refundable tax credits reduce a person’s tax liability by the value of the credit, but cannot reduce 
the liability below zero. In the case of the DTC, the amount of the federal credit multiplied by the 
lowest tax rate yields a non-refundable amount. In the 2016 tax year, the calculation would have 
been: $8,001 x 15 per cent, or $1,200. For a person with no tax liability (for example, an individual 
who is not employed and receiving provincial social assistance), non-refundable credits like the 
1 
Less than complete utilization of the DTC (and by extension benefits that require DTC eligibility such as the RDSP) is well 
acknowledged in Canada, including by the Canada Revenue Agency (Canada Revenue Agency, 2014b; Mendelson, 2015; 
Woolley, 2015).
2 
Note that limitations in available data make accurate assessments of utilization of the DTC difficult and all estimates 
included in this section should be considered with this in mind. To estimate utilization, we need an estimate of the overall 
percentage of the population with disabilities that is eligible for the DTC whether they have applied or not. An absence 
of timely national population data for children (the last survey was in 2006) means that it is not possible to assess recent 
utilization for this group. Estimates in Figure 1 are based on Statistics Canada’s Canadian Survey on Disability (CSD) in 
2012 which provides the best estimate of the qualifying population 15 years and above with severe and prolonged disabilities 
in Canada. It is important to note that this survey defines both impairments in mental and physical function and the severity 
and nature of a prolonged disability differently to the DTC criteria. The CSD also excludes people living in community 
dwellings and on reserve from their sample. More details on underlying calculations are included in Appendix 1.
3 This analysis considers individuals that have successfully submitted a DTC application to the CRA (CRA-deemed eligible) 
– fewer people actually claim the credit on their tax return each year (DTC claimant). This likely reflects the fact that the 
DTC is not directly valuable to some CRA-deemed eligible individuals earning no or low taxable income – these individuals 
may be using their eligibility to access other benefits that require DTC eligibility.
3DTC are of no direct value (see Figure 2).4,5 There have been a number of recommendations to 
convert the DTC into a refundable tax credit in recent decades (Mendelson, 2015; Philipps, 2001; 
Simpson and Stevens, 2016; Woolley, 2015). This would mean that even individuals without taxable 
income would receive direct benefit from the credit, which could lead to increased utilization. 
Yet given that the DTC can be transferred to a caregiver to claim and that eligibility for the DTC 
already is a prerequisite for access to additional (and more valuable) benefits for individuals without 
taxable income, the credit’s non-refundable design cannot be the sole contributing factor to the 
current low utilization.
FIGURE 1
 
Take-up of the DTC is low in Canada but varies noticeably across provinces. Only one in three individuals with qualifying 
disabilities is estimated to have CRA-deemed eligibility to the DTC in Alberta, Ontario, Quebec and Saskatchewan.
LOW UTILIZATION OF THE DTC HAS BROADER IMPLICATIONS BEYOND THE 
VALUE OF CREDIT 
The low utilization of the DTC is a problem not only because many eligible individuals are not 
benefiting from the credit itself, but also because they are missing out on other important supports 
that use DTC eligibility as a prerequisite. Qualifying for the DTC – which is not automatic – 
provides access to a number of other federal and provincial benefits, such as the Child Disability 
Benefit and provincial DTC supplements. DTC eligibility also enables individuals to establish a 
RDSP and qualify for up to $20,000 and $70,000 in government bonds and grants, respectively, 
over the lifetime of the plan and up until they turn 50 years of age, depending on contributions and 
family income (outlined in more detail in Table 1 and Figure 2 below).6 
4 The DTC can be transferred to an eligible caregiver to claim. Our analysis does not analyze the data on transfers because in 
the data available it is not possible to connect a caregiver to a specific individual with DTC eligibility. 
5 We suspect that a large share of transferred DTC claims are from children with DTC eligibility to parents; however, owing 
to the way in which the CRA currently collects data on this it is not possible to connect a caregiver to a specific individual 
with DTC eligibility. 
6 The RDSP is jointly administered by Employment and Social Development Canada (which governs the administration of 
the grant and bond, outreach and awareness, and reporting on program expenditures) and the CRA (which provides the 
legislative framework for the RDSPs and administers the DTC).
4TABLE 1 DISABILITY SUPPORTS REQUIRING DTC ELIGIBILITY IN 2017
Family with a child with a severe & prolonged disability under 
18 years of age
Adult with a severe & prolonged disability
DTC eligibility required  
for access
Disability Tax Credit (federal and provincial)1
DTC Child Supplement (federal and provincial)1
Child Disability Benefit
Home Accessibility Credit
Home Buyers’ Plan
Registered Disability Savings Plan 
Qualified Disability Trust
Disability Tax Credit (federal and provincial)1
Home Accessibility Credit
Disability-related Employment Benefits
Registered Disability Savings Plan
Home Buyers’ Plan
Qualified Disability Trust
DTC eligibility provides 
additional benefits
Medical Expenses Tax Credit
Child Care Expenses Deduction
Tuition, Education and Textbook Amount
Home Buyers’ Amount
Registered Education Savings Plan
Medical Expenses Tax Credit
Working Income Tax Benefit
Tuition, Education and Textbook Amount
Home Buyers’ Amount
Registered Education Savings Plan
1 For all provinces except Quebec
FIGURE 2  VALUE OF THE DTC AND SELECTED TAX BENEFITS THAT REQUIRE DTC ELIGIBILITY AS A 
PREREQUISITE FOR DIFFERENT FAMILY STRUCTURES AND ACROSS TAXABLE INCOME IN 20161
  
For families earning low/no taxable income:
Eligibility to the DTC provides:
• Up to $2,730 through access to the Child Disability Benefit
• $1,000 from an unmatched bond paid into the child’s RDSP (not included  
in graph) 2
For families earning median income (around $70,000):
Eligibility to the DTC could provide:
• Close to $4,500 in federal tax benefits (including the Child Disability Benefit, 
the DTC and the DTC child supplement) 
• Between $600 and $2,500 in provincial disability tax credit supplements, 
depending on the province of residence 
• Up to $3,500 in matched grants paid into the child’s RDSP (not included  
in graph)
• Access to between $750 and $1,500 in federal housing tax credits (not 
included in graph)
For individuals earning low/no taxable income:
Eligibility to the DTC is less valuable but provides: 
• Access to a disability supplement attached to the Working Income  
Tax Benefit of up to $508 for low-income earners (although this can be 
clawed back in provinces with more generous social assistance programs 
like Alberta)
• $1,000 from an unmatched bond paid into the adult’s RDSP (not on graph)
For families or individuals earning sufficient taxable income  
(around $45,000):
• DTC eligibility provided to up to $2,600 in 2016 depending on the 
individual’s province of residence (including federal and provincial DTCs)
• Up to $3,500 in matched grants paid into the adult’s RDSP (not included  
in graph)
• Access to between $750 and $1,500 in federal housing tax credits (not 
included in graph)
1   Calculations were generated using the Canadian Tax and Credit Simulator (CTaCS) and authors’ calculations using benefit information from Canada Revenue 
Agency. Calculations for families assume they are made up of a single-earner couple with a child who qualifies for the DTC. Alberta is used in the graphs above as 
it provides the most generous provincial DTC supplement – modelled total benefits in other provinces would be lower.
2   The government of Canada contributes up to $1,000 in bonds annually to the RDSPs of beneficiaries with incomes below $45,282 (these do not require 
any contributions from the individual) and up to $3,500 in grants to the RDSPs of beneficiaries (the size of the grant depends on the size of the individual’s 
contribution and their income). 
The implications of DTC eligibility are significant, particularly for families with children with 
disabilities and to a lesser extent for lower-income adults with disabilities. Given this, why is 
uptake of the DTC so low?
5BARRIERS TO DTC UTILIZATION – POSSIBLE FACTORS DRIVING LOWER UPTAKE
Below, we consider possible key barriers to accessing the DTC. It is important to note that gaps in 
available information make it difficult to pinpoint which factors are most influential. 
1. Cost versus (perceived) benefit considerations
The non-refundable design of the DTC may be discouraging lower-income earners from applying 
because the perceptions of high application costs are outweighed by perceptions of low benefit 
from the credit itself. Recall, the non-refundable credit was worth a maximum of $1,200 in 2016 if 
the applicant had sufficient taxable income and nothing if the applicant had no taxable income. A 
recent study showed that around half of DTC claimants received little or no value from the credit 
itself because their taxable income was too low (Simpson and Stevens, 2016). Yet as outlined above, 
eligibility for the DTC provides additional benefits beyond simply the value of the credit itself, 
which suggests that there are other factors at play. 
2. Awareness of the DTC
Low awareness of the DTC (or the ability to transfer the credit to a caregiver) and of the benefits 
to which it is a prerequisite, is likely reducing uptake. There are no timely data on awareness of 
the DTC among individuals with qualifying disabilities, with the most recent nationwide survey 
conducted more than 15 years ago. At that time, around one in three adult respondents who did 
not claim the DTC stated that they were not aware of the credit (Statistics Canada, 2004). More 
recently, only moderate awareness of the RDSP (which requires DTC eligibility) was found in a 
2014 evaluation (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2015). The RDSP has even lower 
utilization than the DTC – only one in four individuals with CRA-deemed DTC eligibility had 
established a RDSP in 2015 (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2017).
3. Complexity of the application process
The application form and process are not applicant-friendly, according to submissions to the CRA’s 
public consultations in 2014 (Canada Revenue Agency, 2014). This finding is also supported by the 
proliferation of third-party companies offering to help people, for a fee, to apply for the DTC. This 
industry’s activities have prompted laws limiting the fees applicants may be charged for the service, 
although the CRA has yet to implement regulations for these fees.7 Members of Parliament have 
also noted that budget cuts to the CRA in recent years have reduced access to help and information, 
and this is consistent with recent Auditor General of Canada findings showing that two in three 
calls to the CRA’s call centres are unanswered (“Bill C-462 (Historical). Disability Tax Credit 
Promoters Restrictions Act. House Debate,” 2013; Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2017). 
This likely creates more of a barrier to accessing the DTC for those with fewer resources to seek 
paid professional advice.
As background, an applicant is required to find (and pay) a physician or a specified allied health 
professional to complete their application form (T2201 Disability Tax Credit Certificate). This 
certifies that they are markedly restricted in performing a basic activity of daily living all or 
substantially all of the time, or that the cumulative effect of restrictions across several activities 
7 
In 2014, Bill C-462, the DTC Promoter’s Restrictions Act, was introduced to limit the amount that third-party companies 
could charge to help people with disabilities lodge DTC applications. A submission from the Canadian Medical Association 
to the government noted that it was “concerned that one of the reasons individuals may be engaging the services of third-
party companies is a lack of awareness of the purpose and benefits of the Disability Tax Credit. Additional efforts are 
required to ensure that the Disability Tax Credit form be more informative and user-friendly for patients.” (“Bill C-462 
(Historical). Disability Tax Credit Promoters Restrictions Act. House Debate,” 2013). 
6is equal to being markedly restricted in one basic activity of daily living. The basic activities of 
daily living include: walking, vision, hearing, speaking, dressing, feeding, eliminating and mental 
functions for everyday life. Those on life-sustaining therapy for 14 hours or more a week also 
qualify for the DTC (note that there are restrictions as to what counts as life-sustaining therapy; 
controversially of late, time allocated to diet management and the time that a device such as a 
portable insulin pump takes to deliver therapy do not qualify for people with diabetes (JDRF, 2017)).
Examples of barriers in the application process include:
• Finding a health professional aware of the DTC and willing to complete the application 
form. This can involve an out-of-pocket fee for the applicant – which can vary between 
different health professionals – and may create a barrier to access. Media reports suggest that 
some professionals are refusing to complete the form, particularly for patients with mental 
illnesses, owing to the poorly defined criteria and legal risks of making false statements 
(Goffin, 2017; Ross, 2016).
• Administrative interpretation of eligibility criteria that do not have statutory basis. 
The CRA’s position that being “markedly restricted” is defined as an impairment in function 
being present “at least 90% of the time” is an administrative position not reflected in the 
Income Tax Act. This remains on the application form to this day even though a body of case 
law has recognized this is not an appropriate measure of the effects of an impairment (“Watts 
vs. The Queen, 2004 TCC 535 (CanLII),” 2004). A similar criticism has been raised about the 
CRA’s use of the phrase “life sustaining” in relation to therapy. As a result of administrative 
interpretation, some individuals may be denied eligibility.
• A lack of clarity in eligibility criteria. This results in criteria being interpreted 
inconsistently by health professionals completing the form, and may see some individuals 
wrongly denied eligibility (Goffin, 2017; “Mullings vs. The Queen, 2017 TCC 133 (CanLII),” 
2017; Ross, 2016). For example, the current eligibility criteria require health professionals 
to determine whether a patient is markedly restricted in one basic activity of daily living 
because of their impairment “all or substantially all of the time (at least 90% of the time)”, 
or whether the cumulative effects of a patient’s multiple impairments are equivalent to being 
markedly restricted in one basic activity of daily living. These criteria can be confusing to 
interpret, with little additional clarity provided by the CRA’s definition of “all or substantially 
all of the time” as being “at least 90% of the time”. These criteria are also not aligned with 
current International Classification of Function criteria (international standard to describe 
and measure health and disability).
• Health professionals may struggle to describe how the applicant’s disability impacts 
activities of daily living. This has led to recommendations for the CRA to formally 
recognize supporting information from family members and other people familiar with the 
applicant (Canada Revenue Agency, 2015). 
• Requirements to re-apply for the DTC create additional burden on individuals with 
severe and lifelong impairments in mental and physical functions. Some individuals, 
including all children, are only granted temporary eligibility and required to re-apply at a 
later date, even those with severe lifelong disabilities. This has prompted calls for a simplified 
renewal process (Canada Revenue Agency, 2015). 
• Confusing follow-up requests from the CRA to medical practitioners for additional 
information may see some individuals wrongly denied eligibility. For example, this 
issue was raised in a recent appeals case, which found that the CRA’s follow-up request for 
information to the health professional completing the application was unclear and not a legal 
test for eligibility (“McDermid vs. The Queen, 2014 TCC 264 (CanLII),” 2014).
• Lack of consistency and transparency in CRA processes. This includes concerns about 
inconsistencies in how applications are reviewed, whether those reviewing applications are 
7qualified to do so, opaque internal review, reconsideration and appeals processes, and the 
withholding of documentary evidence by the CRA during appeals processes (Weissman & 
Buchanan, 2016). 
4.  Failure of current eligibility criteria to accurately represent limitations  
in activities
Some existing eligibility provisions may not be accurately assessing whether a person has a 
severe and prolonged impairment that impacts their basic activities of daily living. This may be 
contributing to lower take-up. Examples include:
• Strict criteria related to life-sustaining therapy restrict many people with relevant 
impairments. In some cases, the time threshold in therapy is too long and/or required 
treatments fall outside of those deemed eligible. This includes the CRA’s most recent action 
in repealing DTC eligibility for many people with diabetes on the basis that the time that 
a device such as a portable insulin pump takes to deliver therapy does not qualify as life-
sustaining therapy (JDRF, 2017). This and related criteria – including that time allocated to 
calculating carbohydrates is not currently allowed despite being an essential and inseparable 
function to calculating insulin dosage – have been criticized as being arbitrary and lacking 
evidence (Williams and Prowten, 2017).
• Strict criteria for mental illnesses. For example, it is required that problem solving, goal 
setting and judgment all be present for an applicant to be deemed eligible for the DTC. 
It has been argued that this is a stricter requirement than for an applicant with a physical 
impairment (Cohen, 2017). 
• The required duration of an impairment (90 per cent of the time) for mental illnesses is 
incongruent with the nature of these disabilities. Some disabilities are temporary, episodic 
and change in nature and severity over the course of the person’s life (Schizophrenia Society 
of Ontario, 2014). This has also been addressed in case law, which has recognized both the 
constant vulnerability of relapse for a person with a mental illness even if the illness is not 
present most of the time, and that a mathematical formula is not an appropriate measure of 
the effects of an impairment (“Buchanan vs. The Queen, 2001 CanLII 763 (TCC),” 2001; 
“Watts vs. The Queen, 2004 TCC 535 (CanLII),” 2004).
SUGGESTED POLICY ACTIONS TO REDUCE BARRIERS TO UPTAKE OF THE DTC 
AND RELATED BENEFITS
It is clear that more information and reforms to administrative processes are needed to reduce 
barriers to utilization of the DTC. More broadly, there is a need to pursue and develop policy 
that addresses social policy objectives and improves supports for low-income Canadians with 
disabilities. Given that different policy objectives will likely require different policy instruments, 
these supports should be considered separately from the DTC, which is designed to address 
horizontal equity in the tax system. It is in this context we recommend actions to both improve 
uptake of the DTC and related benefits. 
1.  Better information is needed. Monitoring and evaluation of any program require accurate 
data to determine whether the program is meeting its stated goals. The lack of linked disability 
population data and benefit utilization data make it difficult for anyone – including the federal 
government – to assess how effective the DTC is in reaching its target population and where 
efforts should be taken to improve awareness and access. This is particularly important given 
the DTC’s role as a prerequisite to other benefits (with more of a social policy objective). The 
absence of any timely national data for children with disabilities is also a concern. We currently 
8cannot evaluate the impact of disability benefits like the DTC or the Child Disability Benefit for 
children with disabilities, including those on eligible therapies. 
2.  Improve administration of the DTC. The recent announcement of the reinstatement of the 
Disability Advisory Committee (DAC) in 2018 is a promising step towards improving access 
to the DTC. The DAC’s mandate is to review the existing administrative practices and provide 
advice to the CRA on improving awareness, utilization and the CRA’s administration and 
interpretation of laws and programs relating to disability tax measures (Canada Revenue 
Agency, 2017). We hope the DAC will address the barriers outlined and suggest some specific 
recommendations to this effect. 
• Introduce a clear and transparent review and appeals process for the DTC. This involves 
ensuring appropriately trained staff are assessing DTC application forms, internal eligibility 
decisions are made in a reliable and consistent manner, and that a clear and transparent 
appeals process is established for those denied eligibility. 
• Consider a new disability assessment process for disability benefits, decoupling 
eligibility for other important benefits from the DTC. By design, the DTC is not a 
universal benefit – it is a tax-fairness measure that benefits those who pay taxes. Using 
eligibility to a benefit that does not provide value to all individuals with qualifying 
disabilities as a gateway to benefits with other policy objectives, is poor design. This 
could be resolved by separating the eligibility determination from the DTC. One solution, 
which warrants more investigation, could be the development of a single new assessment 
process, where different components could be used to determine access to different benefits, 
including the DTC, the RDSP and the Child Disability Benefit. This would provide an 
opportunity to address concerns around existing eligibility provisions, better align different 
eligibility requirements to programs with different aims and enshrine criteria clearly in 
legislation. This would also provide an opportunity to develop more appropriate criteria 
based on internationally recognized criteria such as the WHO’s International Classification 
of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF).8 Given that our main population survey by 
Statistics Canada is designed based on these criteria, this would also improve our ability to 
assess utilization of benefits. If used only to determine eligibility for federal tax measures, 
this assessment process could continue to be administered by the CRA, although it may 
be better located within another institution such as the ESDC (which currently undertakes 
disability assessments for the Canada Pension Plan Disability program and also jointly 
administers the RDSP). 
3.  Improve support for individuals with disability living in low income. The focus on the 
design and barriers to the DTC does not address a more fundamental social policy issue: existing 
supports for people with disabilities and their caregivers – particularly those living in low income 
– are not adequately meeting their needs. Adults without employment history and children with 
disabilities, living in low income, rely predominantly on provincial supports that are not portable, 
vary significantly in value and design between provinces and can be difficult to navigate. 
Broader consideration and co-ordination of policy measures that guarantee improved access, 
independence, portability and support for low-income individuals with disability are needed.
8 
The ICF is a classification of health and health-related domains based on body, individual and societal perspectives. 
It provides a universal framework for defining disability and conceptualizes health and disability in a comprehensive 
manner, highlighting interactions among impairment, function and disability. In contrast, the DTC certification process 
has been criticized as being too restrictive in how disability is defined, neglecting important concepts critical for disability 
assessments such as interactions between individuals and their physical and social environment (Conti-Becker et al., 2007).
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APPENDIX 1: ESTIMATED UPTAKE OF THE DTC BY AGE AND BY PROVINCE IN 2014
Individuals with DTC eligibility1 
(1)
Prevalence of severe disability2
(%)
(2)
Population 
with severe disability3
(3)
Estimated 
take-up of the DTC4
(%)
(1 ÷ 3)
Age5
0-186 189,653 n/a n/a n/a
19-34 121,146 1.8 – 2.8 138,868 – 217,887 87.2 – 55.6
35-49 113,114 2.8 – 8.5 200,151 – 614,362 56.5 – 18.4
50-59 153,169 8.5 453,772 33.8
Province (19-59 year olds)
Alberta 36,632 4.0 99,577 36.8
British Columbia 55,437 5.0 133,218 41.6
Manitoba 20,089 5.1 36,341 55.3
New Brunswick 12,089 6.6 27,613 43.8
Newfoundland & Labrador 10,567 5.6 16,565 63.8
Nova Scotia 17,246 6.5 34,283 50.3
Ontario 163,554 5.9 464,275 35.2
Prince Edward Island 2,774 4.8 3,806 72.9
Quebec 57,953 3.5 162,944 35.6
Saskatchewan 10,255 4.6 28,778 35.6
Total 386,596 5.0 1,007,452 38.4
 
1  Excludes those claiming the DTC living outside of Canada. Data provided by the CRA upon request.
2   For age groups, this includes upper and lower severe disability prevalence given that age bands in the CSD do not 
correspond to those from the CRA data. Age groups in the CSD are as follows: 15-24, 25-44, 45-64 and 65+.  
 
For provinces, this prevalence refers to a broader age band (15 to 64 years) than for the DTC data from the CRA, that is 19- 
to 59-year-olds. Prevalence rates are calculated from Statistics Canada Canadian Survey on Disability 2012.
3  Prevalence rates in previous columns applied to population data from Statistics Canada.
4   This is only a rough estimate given the discrepancies between the two data sources from the CRA and from Statistics 
Canada described in footnote 2. Nevertheless, given available information this is the best estimate possible.
5  Data in this section include both provinces and territories.
6  There are no timely data on the prevalence of severe disability among children in Canada. 
Sources: (Canada Revenue Agency, 2014a; Statistics Canada, 2012, 2017)
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